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9	CENTRAL DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA	
10			
11	JOHMMY ARNALDO GARCIA,	No. 5:20-cv-796	
12	Petitioner,	Hon.	
13	v.	EMERGENCY NOTICE OF MOTION	
14	CHAD T. WOLF, Acting Secretary of	AND EX PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING	
15	Homeland Security; MATTHEW T. ALBENCE, Deputy Director and	ORDER AS TO COVID-19-RELATED RELEASE OF DETAINEE FROM	
16	Senior Official Performing Duties of the Director of U.S. Immigration and	DETENTION	
17	Customs Enforcement; DAVID A. MARIN, Field Office Director;		
18	GABRIEL VALDEZ, Officer in Charge; JAMES JANECKA, Warden,		
19	Adelanto ICE Processing Center, Respondents		
20	THE STATE OF THE S	•	
21	Petitioner Johmmy Arnaldo Garcia	a, by and through his counsel, Hannah K.	
22	Comstock, hereby moves this honorable	Court for a temporary restraining order	
23	enjoining Respondents from continuing t	to detain him and ordering his immediate	
24	release from immigration detention at Ac	delanto. This motion is based upon Local	
25	Rule 65-1; this Notice of Motion; the atta	ached Memorandum of Points and	
	Authorities; the supporting declarations;	all documents and pleadings on file in this	
26	action, including the Petition for Writ of	Habeas Corpus and accompanying	
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	TEMPORARY RESTRAINING (ON AND EX PARTE MOTION FOR DRDER AS TO COVID-RELATED SEE FROM DETENTION	

1	declarations; and any further information pr	resented to the Court in connection with
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4		etfully submitted,
5		dully submitted,
6		
7	D-:: /-	GRANT DEFENDERS LAW CENTER <u>' Hannah K. Comstock</u>
8	Hanna	h K. Comstock, Esq.
9	Course	eeth K. Soni, Esq. el for Petitioner
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EMERGENCY NOTICE OF MOTION AND EX PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AS TO COVID-RELATED RELEASE OF DETAINEE FROM DETENTION

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I. INTRODUCTION¹

The world is facing an unprecedented threat. The Coronavirus is a novel pandemic that, as of 9:16 AM on April 15, has infected at least 2,034,309 people and killed 129,913, with 26,317 deaths in the United States alone.² In San Bernardino County, where the Adelanto ICE Processing Center ("Adelanto" or "Facility") is located, there have been 977 confirmed cases and thirty-one deaths.³

Federal, state, and local governments, as well as prosecutors, judges, and correctional administrators have codified social distancing into ordinance and policy, issuing "shelter-in-place" orders and releasing thousands of criminal inmates to reduce prison populations. The public has been ordered to practice social distancing and follow strict hygiene protocols to abate the rampant spread of this novel and currently incurable disease.

Experts across the country have repeatedly warned that the risk posed by infectious diseases in jails and prisons is significantly higher than in the community, both in terms of risk of transmission, exposure, and harm to individuals who become infected. With hundreds, if not thousands, of detainees packed into congregate settings, nonexistent hygiene protocols, and insufficient (abysmal) medical infrastructure, these facilities are operating in flagrant disregard of the protocols implemented in the remainder of this country.

 ¹ Mr. Garcia includes this factual background in this application as a summary for the Court. The complete factual background is set forth in his concurrently filed Petition for Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Injunctive Relief. He hereby incorporates that factual information into this motion.

² COVID-19 CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC, Worldometer.info (last updated Apr. 15, 2020, 4:16PM GMT), https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/; Coronavirus: United States, Worldometer.info (last updated Apr. 15, 2020, 4:16PM GMT), https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/.

³ Coronavirus in San Bernardino County, SBCOVID-19.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2020, 3:11 PM), http://sbcovid19.com/.

Petitioner Johmmy Arnaldo Garcia is an immigrant detainee with critical medical and psychiatric conditions. He is currently housed in Adelanto, where the necessary preventive efforts are impossible. As a thirty-year-old man suffering from chronic asthma, hypertension, and longstanding mental health issues, the threat to his health and safety at Adelanto is not only significant, but near certain. Mr. Garcia is sitting in a ticking time bomb.

In light of this imminent threat and ICE's steadfast refusal to follow its

In light of this imminent threat and ICE's steadfast refusal to follow its criminal counterparts and release its civil detainees, Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court exercise its equitable powers to order his immediate release from immigrant detention to the home of his sponsor.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Mr. Garcia is "High Risk" for COVID-19 Complications, Has Solid Release Plans, and Does Not Pose a Danger to the Community

Mr. Garcia is a thirty-year-old asylum seeker with asthma, hypertension, pre-diabetes, and longstanding mental health issues. Mental Health Progress Note (Jan. 13, 2020); Medical Progress Note (Nov. 19, 2019); Bell Dec'l at 2 ¶ 8. Asthma, hypertension, and diabetes are prototypical health conditions triggering a "high-risk" designation.⁴ Each condition on its own elevates Mr. Garcia's risk to

⁴ Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Frequently Asked Questions, CDC.GOV (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html?CDC AA refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-ncov%2Fprepare%2Fchildren-faq.html; Coronavirus Disease 2019, People with Asthma, CDC.Gov (last visited Apr. 12, 2020, 5:40 PM), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/asthma.html; Emily Bamforth, Hypertension could be a leading factor in coronavirus deaths: Here's what we know, Cleveland.com (last updated Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.cleveland.com/news/2020/03/hypertension-could-be-a-leading-factor-in-coronavirus-deaths-heres-what-to-know.html; Dave Fornell, FSC Council on Hypertension Says ACE-1 and ARBs Do Not Increase COVID-19 Mortality, DiagnosticandInterventionalCardiology.com (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.dicardiology.com/content/esc-council-hypertension-says-ace-i-and-

arbs-do-not-increase-covid-19-mortality. Ex. 3 - Gwen Mitchell et al., Expert Declaration Submitted by Experts in Psychology & Social Work on the Known

1	suffering complications from COVID-19; when taken in the aggregate, along with
2	his mental health conditions, Mr. Garcia's risk to is compounded to a frightening
3	measure.
4	Mr. Garcia has been a Lawful Permanent Resident since 2011 and currently
5	in removal proceedings based on a 2018 conviction for arson. Bell Dec'1 at 2–3 ¶
6	11. This conviction, and his two other convictions, were the result of undiagnosed
7	mental illness and consequent homelessness. <i>Id.</i> at 3 ¶¶ 13–15. Before his
8	conviction, he struggled to cope with his significant past trauma and fell into using
9	alcohol and drugs and eventually became homeless. <i>Id.</i> at 3 ¶¶ 12–15. From
10	March 2017 through April 2018, Mr. Garcia was arrested and sustained three
11	convictions while homeless. <i>Id.</i> at 3 ¶¶ 13–15.
12	First, in March 2017, he was arrested for grand theft and convicted of
13	section 487(a) of the California Penal Code. <i>Id.</i> at 3 ¶ 13. The police report
14	indicated that Mr. Garcia dissembled a wheelchair allegedly owned by his
15	neighbor to sell the wheels. <i>Id</i> .
16	Second, in April 2018, he was arrested for being under the influence of a
17	controlled substance. <i>Id.</i> at 3 ¶ 14. The police report indicated that Mr. Garcia
18	approached an officer seeking protection from people who were hiding in a nearby
19	bush and trying to hurt him. <i>Id</i> .
20	Third, and lastly, in 2018, Mr. Garcia was arrested and convicted of arson
21	for lighting a trashcan on fire while homeless. Bell Dec'l at 2–3 ¶ 11. This
22	conviction is the sole reason he is currently in removal proceedings. In 2019, upon
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26	Impact of Adverse Experiences, Extreme Social Isolation & Public Health
27	Pandemics 4–5 (Mar. 30, 2020) (opining that A person's anxiety, depression, and psychosis, among others, can impact their ability to "adhere to treatment or
28	necessary preventative protocols, increasing the likelihood of poor disease management.")

completing his criminal sentence, ICE arrested Mr. Garcia and transferred him to the ICE Adelanto Processing Center. *Id.*In criminal custody, Mr. Garcia was diagnosed with several psychological mental illnesses, as detailed more fully in the corresponding petition for writ of habeas corpus. While detained, he has had no behavioral issues. *Id.* at 3 ¶ 15.

B. Conditions at Adelanto Detention Facility

Social distancing at Adelanto is impossible. Adelanto has capacity to hold, under normal circumstances, nearly 2000 civil immigration detainees. Even at seventy-five percent capacity, Adelanto's population of 1,455 people still face the same bleak reality.

Mr. Garcia shares a single dormitory-type room with three other men and eats all three meals every day with nearly thirty other people. Bell Dec'l at 3–4 ¶ 17. These conditions are dangerous, especially at mealtimes when "[t]he guards, detainees and cafeteria workers do not regularly wear gloves or masks to prevent the spread of the coronavirus." *Bravo Castillo v. Barr*, 2020 WL 1502864, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2020); *Hernandez v. Wolf*, CV 20-60017-TJH (KSx) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020), ECF No. 17, at *5 (same). In a setting like Adelanto's, "social distancing is an oxymoron."

The bathroom conditions are no different. Mr. Garcia is forced to share a shower seven other men. Bell Dec'l at 3–4 ¶ 17. Toilets, sinks, and showers are communal, allowing countless opportunities for respiratory droplets to contaminate hard, frequently encountered surfaces. Ex. 2 - Romines Dec'l at pp. 9–10 ¶¶ 21–22; Ex. 1 - Meyer Dec'l at p. 2 ¶ 9. The soap supply is regularly low in Mr. Garcia's shared bathroom and he has not been given hand sanitizer. Bell Dec'l at

Garcia's shared bathroom and he has not been given hand sanitizer. Bell Dec'l at

⁵ Letter from Scott A. Allen et al., to House Committee on Homeland Security, et al., (Mar. 19, 2020) at 4, *available at* https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6816336/032020-Letter-From-Drs-Allen-Rich-to-Congress-Re.pdf.

3–4 ¶ 17. These conditions welcome spread of the virus, as "[i]t may be difficult or impossible for detainees to have access to sufficient soap and water to wash their hands as frequently as public health officials recommend." Ex. 2 - Romines Dec'l at pp. 10–11 ¶ 22; Ex. 1 - Meyer Dec'l at p. 2 ¶ 11.

Medical staff have accused Mr. Garcia of "feigning" symptoms of his mental illness "for secondary gain," and he fears the same reaction if he sought treatment for COVID-19. Bell Dec'l at 4 ¶ 18. If Mr. Garcia required immediate care, he would be relegated to Adelanto's historically negligent and deficient medical care—a finding confirmed by DHS' own watchdog organization. According to DHS' Office of the Inspector General, detainees at Adelanto receive "untimely and inadequate medical care" that routinely falls below ICE minimum standards. Adelanto has a small medical staff, and DHS internal reviews find high turnover rates and limited experience among nurses at the facility. There are shortages of medical staff at Adelanto, resulting in long delays and cancelled appointments for those seeking care at the facility.

Adelanto is not a self-contained environment. ICE has restricted detainee movement between wards, but that does shield them from the conditions in other wards and the outside community because DO movement is not limited. As Field Officer Valdez recently explained, "DO's ... are continually moving through [Adelanto] during their shifts, presenting documents to detainees for signature, serving NTA's, serving parole documents, serving notices and decisions, speaking with detainees, conducting detainee interviews, answering detainee requests in person, conducting observation of the facility, among other duties." Defendants' Supp'l Filing of Declaration of Gabriel Valdez ISO Opp. to TRO, *Torres v. Nielsen*, 18-02604-JGB-SHL (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2020), ECF No. 139-1 at 4 ¶ 11.

The inefficacy of ICE's response to COVID-19 is currently playing out at the national level. To date, at least eighty-nine detainees and twenty-one ICE

- 1 employees at its detention centers have already been infected with COVID-19.6
- 2 ICE insists that there are no officially confirmed cases of COVID-19 at Adelanto.
- 3 yet, ICE has quarantined several housing units since March 13 and an Immigration
- 4 Judge sitting in the Adelanto Courthouse has been on medical leave since March
- 19 for undisclosed reasons.⁷ Adding another layer of suspicion, ICE has not 5
- released information about infected staff members working at its private facilities, 6
- like Adelanto.⁸ It would be unreasonable for Mr. Garcia to *not* operate under the 7
- assumption that COVID-19 exists at Adelanto. The Government's head-in-the-8
- 9 sand approach to "managing" COVID-19 simply cannot shield Adelanto from the
- 10 virus, as underscored by the nearly 100 detainees who have tested positive in other
- 11 facilities operating under the same approach.

III. NOTICE TO OPPOSING PARTY

On April 14, 2020, Mr. Garcia's counsel provided notice to the United States Attorney's Office that this application would be filed. Soni Dec'l at 1 ¶¶ 1. In advance of filing, Mr. Garcia's counsel provided government counsel an unredacted copy of the habeas corpus petition and this application along with supporting documentation. *Id.* at $1 \, \P \, 2$.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

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⁶ ICE Guidance on COVID-19, ICE.Gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2020, 9:28) AM), https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus.

Facility and seven ICE detainees testing positive).

⁷ Amnesty International, "We Are Adrift, About To Sink": The Looming Covid-19 Disaster In United States Immigration Detention Facilities 19 (Apr. 7, 2020), available at

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5120952020ENGLISH.PDF.

⁸ Compare ICE Guidance on COVID-19, supra note 6 (reporting one ICE employee and five detainees testing positive for COVID-19 at Hudson County Jail), with John Heinis, County jail COVID-19 update: 4th worker dies, 26 in cutosy tested positive, 87 Cos self-isolating, HudsonCountyView,com (Apr. 7, 2020, 3:24 PM), https://hudsoncountyview.com/county-jail-covid-19-update-4th-worker-dies-26-in-custody-tested-positive-87-cos-self-isolating/ (reporting five COVID-19 related deaths of civil employees at the Hudson County Correctional Facility and seven ICE detainees testing positive)

1	Mr. Garcia is entitled to a temporary restraining order if he shows: (1) a
2	likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
3	in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his
4	favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res.
5	Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Stuhlbard Int'l Sales Co. v. John D.
6	Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that preliminary
7	injunction and temporary restraining orders are "substantially identical").
8	The Ninth Circuit has adopted a "sliding scale" approach wherein, "a
9	stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another."
10	Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citations
11	omitted). Thus, a petitioner is entitled to a temporary restraining order if "serious
12	questions going to the merits [are] raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply
13	in [petitioner's] favor." All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131
14	(9th Cir. 2011). Put differently, to succeed under the "serious question" test, Mr.
15	Garcia must show that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury and that an injunction
16	is in the public's interest. <i>Id.</i> at 1132.
17	Mr. Garcia satisfies each of these requirements. Accordingly, this Court
18	should use its equitable power to order his immediate release, as it and other
19	federal courts have done in several nearly identical cases. See Bravo Castillo v.
20	Barr, 2020 WL 1502864, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (granting immigrant detainees'
21	motion for temporary restraining order and releasing two detainees because of
22	Coronavirus threat); <i>Hernandez v. Wolf</i> , CV 20-60017-TJH (KSx) (C.D. Cal. Apr.
23	1, 2020), ECF No. 17 (granting immigrant detainee's motion for temporary
24	restraining order and releasing immigrant detainee because of Coronavirus threat);
25	Hernandez Velasquez v. Wolf, CV 20-00627-TJH (GJS) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2020),
26	ECF. No. 32 (granting temporary restraining order for immediate release of
27	immigrant detainee); Chernykh v. Valdez, CV 16-2184-RGK, 2017 WL 3000013

1	(C.D. Cal. May 22, 2017) (granting immigrant detainee's motion for preliminary
2	injunction ordering her release pending disposition of habeas corpus petition);
3	Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, No. 18-71460, 2020 WL 1429877, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar.
4	24, 2020) ("In light of the rapidly escalating public health crisis, which public
5	health authorities predict will especially impact immigration detention centers, the
6	court sua sponte orders that Petitioner be immediately released from detention
7	."); Seretse-Khama v. Ashcroft, 215 F. Supp. 2d 37, 54 (D.D.C. 2002) (ordering
8	preliminary injunction releasing immigration detainee); Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D.
9	390 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (granting injunctive relief ordering release of detainees
10	with final removal orders), aff'd, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003), opinion withdrawn
11	on denial of reh'g sub nom; Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005), as
12	amended on reh'g (Oct. 20, 2005).
13	A. Mr. Garcia is Likely to Succeed on the Merits
14	1. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause Prohibits Any Punitive
14 15	1. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause Prohibits Any Punitive Conditions of Civil Confinement and Requires Mr. Garcia's Release
	 The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause Prohibits Any Punitive Conditions of Civil Confinement and Requires Mr. Garcia's Release When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration
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15 16	When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration
15 16 17	When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration law, the person is a civil detainee, even if he has a prior criminal conviction. <i>See</i>
15 16 17 18	When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration law, the person is a civil detainee, even if he has a prior criminal conviction. <i>See Zadvydas v. Davis</i> , 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). A civil detainee is entitled to more
15 16 17 18	When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration law, the person is a civil detainee, even if he has a prior criminal conviction. <i>See Zadvydas v. Davis</i> , 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). A civil detainee is entitled to more considerate treatment than criminal detainees, whose conditions of confinement are
15 16 17 18 19 20	When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration law, the person is a civil detainee, even if he has a prior criminal conviction. <i>See Zadvydas v. Davis</i> , 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). A civil detainee is entitled to more considerate treatment than criminal detainees, whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. <i>See Youngberg v. Romeo</i> , 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982).
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration law, the person is a civil detainee, even if he has a prior criminal conviction. <i>See Zadvydas v. Davis</i> , 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). A civil detainee is entitled to more considerate treatment than criminal detainees, whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. <i>See Youngberg v. Romeo</i> , 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982). Accordingly, under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a civil detainee
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration law, the person is a civil detainee, even if he has a prior criminal conviction. <i>See Zadvydas v. Davis</i> , 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). A civil detainee is entitled to more considerate treatment than criminal detainees, whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. <i>See Youngberg v. Romeo</i> , 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982). Accordingly, under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a civil detainee "cannot be subjected to conditions that 'amount to punishment." <i>King v. Cnty. of</i>
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	When the Government detains a person for the violation of an immigration law, the person is a civil detainee, even if he has a prior criminal conviction. <i>See Zadvydas v. Davis</i> , 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). A civil detainee is entitled to more considerate treatment than criminal detainees, whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. <i>See Youngberg v. Romeo</i> , 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982). Accordingly, under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a civil detainee "cannot be subjected to conditions that 'amount to punishment." <i>King v. Cnty. of Los Angeles</i> , 885 F.3d 548, 557 (9th Cir. 2018)

2004). Conditions are therefore presumptively punitive, and thus presumptively

1 unconstitutional, when they are similar to or worse than those of criminal pretrial 2 detainees. *Id.*; see also King, 885 F.3d at 557. It likewise follows that 3 "[c]onditions of confinement that violate the Eighth Amendment will necessarily 4 violate the Fifth Amendment" for immigration detainees. Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 5 710, 714 (9th Cir. 2017) ("...decisions defining the constitutional rights of 6 prisoners establish a floor for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights."); City of Revere v. 7 Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Put differently, an 8 immigrant detainee can establish a Fifth Amendment due process violation under 9 standards far less onerous than the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual 10 punishment standard. 11 "[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against 12 his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some 13 responsibility for his safety and general well being." Helling v. McKinney, 509 14 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dei't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989)). The Eighth Amendment—and by extension, the Due 15 16 Process clause—requires that "inmates must be furnished with the basic human 17 needs, one of which is 'reasonable safety." Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189, 18 200 (1989)). As such, the Government violates the Eighth Amendment if it 19 confines a detainee in unsafe conditions. *Id.* ("It is 'cruel and unusual punishment 20 to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions." (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 21 457 U.S. 307, 315–16(1982)). 22 It follows that the Government may not "ignore a condition of confinement 23 that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness." Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. This 24 extends to protection from an "unsafe, life-threatening condition" such as an 25 infectious disease. Id.; see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978) (Eighth 26 Amendment violation found where, among other things, inmates in punitive 27 isolation were crowded into cells and some had infectious maladies such as

1 hepatitis and venereal disease); Johnson v. Pleasant Valley State Prison, 505 F. 2 App'x 631, 632 (9th Cir. 2013) (Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal of prisoner's suit 3 alleging *Helling* violations based on exposure to Valley Fever, a dangerous fungal infection). Accordingly, "[a] civil detainee's constitutional rights are violated if a 4 5 condition of his confinement places him at substantial risk of suffering serious 6 harm, such as the harm caused by a pandemic." Bravo Castillo, 2020 WL 7 1502864, at *1 (citing *Smith v. Washington*, 781 F. App'x 595, 598 (9th Cir. 8 2019)). 9 The Eighth Amendment's protections extend to "unreasonable risks of 10 serious damage to [a prisoner's] future health," even if the person has yet to suffer any ill effects. Helling, 509 U.S. at 33 ("It would be odd to deny an injunction to 12 inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on 13 the ground that nothing yet had happened to them. The Courts of Appeals have 14 plainly recognized that a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic 15 event.") Courts may also account for person's individual circumstances and 16 medical histories in determining whether a health risk rises to the level of an 17 Eighth Amendment violation. See Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 18 2010) (holding that district court did not err in concluding that dangerously high 19 temperatures posed a significant health risk to certain inmates taking psychotropic 20 medications in violation of the Eight Amendment). 21 In the Ninth Circuit, the question is not whether the prisoner has suffered 22 actual harm; it is whether there is "serious risk of substantial harm." Thomas v. 23 Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151 n.5 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original); Beagle v. 24 Schwarzenegger, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ("The case law from the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court support Plaintiffs' contention that an 25 26 inmate's mere exposure to a dangerous condition may provide grounds for an

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Eighth Amendment claim.") An individual's heightened risk of harm due to

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preexisting conditions are thus certainly probative to the more protective Fifth Amendment Due Process analysis.

2. Mr. Garcia's Confinement at Adelanto Exposes him to a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm from COVID-19

Mr. Garcia's continued detention at Adelanto exposes him to a very real risk of severe illness, if not death, from COVID-19. Public health experts agree: "[t]he risk posed by infectious diseases in jails and prisons is significantly higher than in the community, both in terms of risk of transmission, exposure, and harm to individuals who become infected." Ex. 1 - Meyer Dec'l at 2 ¶ 7. This has already proven true at ICE detention facilities throughout the nation and it is only a matter of time before Adelanto joins its sister facilities. Nothing in ICE's April 10 COVID-19 Pandemic Response Requirements changes the heightened risk facing Mr. Garcia at Adelanto, nor does it cure the facility's abysmal record of substandard medical treatment. See generally Fraihat v. ICE, CV 19-05146-JGB (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2019).

First, Mr. Garcia and his fellow detainees have none of the personal protective equipment required to protect against COVID-19. Bell Dec'l at 3–4 ¶ 17. ICE's newly updated guidelines fail to confront recent guidance from the Centers for Disease and Prevention urging individuals to wear cloth face coverings in public to prevent the spread of the virus. Not surprisingly, Adelanto Officers frequently patrol the Facility without face masks, even when escorting a detainee with COVID-19 symptoms to the medical center. *Id.* Cleaning is even less consistent, with Mr. Garcia observing officers only sporadically cleaning door handles and failing to clean telephones and tablets between uses. *Id.*

Second, even if everyone at the facility were provided personal protective equipment, social distancing is impossible at Adelanto. Absent social distancing,

every other measure taken is futile because Mr. Garcia spends all day and all night
in communal sleeping quarters, shower facilities, dining and recreation areas. Bell
Dec'l at 3–4 ¶ 17. Materially similar facts led this Court to recently grant a
temporary restraining order because:

Civil detainees must be protected by the Government. Petitioners have not been protected. They are not kept at least 6 feet apart from others at all times. They have been put into a situation where they are forced to touch surfaces touched by other detainees, such as with common sinks, toilets and showers. Moreover, the Government cannot deny the fact that the risk of infection in immigration detention facilities — and jails — is particularly high if an asymptomatic guard, or other employee, enters a facility. While social visits have been discontinued at Adelanto, the rotation of guards and other staff continues.

Bravo Castillo, 2020 WL 1502864, at *5

Finally, the virus moves much more quickly than ICE. ICE's protocol of isolating only symptomatic individuals or those who have come into contact with a known carrier of the infection while ignoring asymptomatic individuals has already proven ineffective. The Government cannot reduce risk to Mr. Garcia's life and health unless it regularly tests for COVID-19 every individual, detainees, and guards alike, that come within six feet of him—a patently improbable protocol given the nationwide shortage in testing.

3. Mr. Garcia's Continued Detention is Unjustifiably Punitive

Apart from exposing him to a substantial risk of harm, Mr. Garcia's continued detention is unjustifiably punitive when compared to treatment of his criminal counterparts. Major jails and prisons throughout the nation have taken significant steps to reduce their inmate populations by releasing low-level offenders and persons with medical vulnerabilities.⁹ The Government, however,

⁹ Marissa Wenzke, 1,700 jail inmates in L.A. County released over coronavirus concerns, sheriff says, KTLA5 (lasted updated Mar. 24, 2020, 4:06

1	has refused any discussions about medically necessary release for Mr. Garcia,
2	leaving him detained under conditions more restrictive than those of persons
3	serving criminal sentences in jails and prisons. The Ninth Circuit has clearly held
4	that that conditions of confinement for civil detainees are presumptively punitive if
5	they are equal to or more restrictive than those conditions of criminal confinement.
6	Jones, 393 F.3d at 933-34; see also King, 885 F.3d at 557. Mr. Garcia's current
7	conditions of confinement are therefore presumptively punitive and thus
8	presumptively unconstitutional.
9	Mr. Garcia is held under conditions no different from those in <i>Bravo</i>
10	Castillo. This Court has already made clear that Government cannot "ignore a
11	condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness," and
12	""[a] remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event." Bravo Castillo,
13	2020 WL 1502864, at *4, *5 (quoting <i>Helling</i> , 509 U.S. at 33). Yet Mr. Garcia has
14	shown that the Government is doing just that—exposing him to a known
15	substantial risk of harm under the pretext that it has yet to occur. These conditions
16	of confinement are unconstitutional, and Mr. Garcia is entitled to release.
17	B. Mr. Garcia Will Undeniably Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent Relief
18	There can be no doubt that Mr. Garcia will suffer irreparable harm absent
19	relief. "It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights
20	unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Bravo Castillo, 2020 WL 1502864,
21	at *6 (citing <i>Hernandez v. Sessions</i> , 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017)). Even
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24	PM), https://ktla.com/news/local-news/1700-jail-inmates-in-l-a-county-released-over-coronavirus-concerns-sheriff-says/ ; Alene Tchekmedian, Paige St. John, &
25	Matt Hamilton, L.A. County Releasing Some Inmates from Jail to Combat Coronavirus, L.A. Times (Mar. 16, 2020),
26	https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-03-16/la-jail-population-arrests-down-amid-coronavirus; Julia Marsh & Ben Feuerherd, NYC jail population lowes
27	since World War II after coronavirus release, NewYorkPost (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/03/26/nyc-jail-population-lowest-since-world-war-

ii-after-coronavirus-releases/.

under normal conditions, unlawful immigration detention causes irreparable harm. *See Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 995 (noting that there are many forms of irreparable harm "imposed on anyone who is subject to immigration detention," including "subpar medical and psychiatric care" and "economic burdens imposed on both detainees and their family members.") It is equally well-established that threats to a person's health from government action also qualify as irreparable harm. See *M.R. v. Dreyfus*, 663 F.3d 1100, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011); *Ind. Living Ctr. of S. Calif., Inc. v. Shewry*, 543 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (limiting access to "muchneeded pharmaceuticals" causes irreparable harm).

The time to act is now, before Mr. Garcia becomes Adelanto's first COVID-casualty. An average, non-complicated COVID-19 case can require hospitalization and a significant fraction end in death. If infected, Mr. Garcia faces acute risk of a severe case necessitating intensive treatment because of his asthma, hypertension, prediabetes, and significant mental health issues. Under these conditions, it is no hyperbole to say that there is a significant possibility Mr. Garcia faces irreversible harm absent action from this Court. Mr. Garcia's continued detention at Adelanto during the COVID-19 pandemic "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."

C. The Balance of Equities Tilts Sharply in Mr. Garcia's Favor

Even a passing glance at the third factor favors Mr. Garcia's release. Like the several petitioners that this Court recently released from Adelanto, Mr. Garcia "faces irreparable harm to [his] constitutional rights and health." *Bravo Castillo*, 2020 WL 1502864, at *6. "Faced with... preventable human suffering," a court should "have little difficulty concluding that the balance of hardship tips decidedly in [movants'] favor." *Hernandez*, 872 F. 3d at 996. "Indeed, there is no harm to the Government when a court prevents the Government from engaging in unlawful practices." *Bravo Castillo*, 2020 WL 1502864 at *6 (citing *Rodriguez v. Robbins*, 715 F.3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013)); *Zepeda v. I.N.S.*, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he INS

cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations."). Accordingly, "[t]he balance of the equities tip sharply in favor of the Petitioner[]." *Bravo Castillo*, 2020 WL 1502864 at *6.

D. Release of Mr. Garcia is in the Public Interest

Finally, it is in both the Government's and the broader public's interest to release detainees at heightened risk of COVID-19 infection. As this Court stated in *Bravo Castillo*:

The emergency injunctive relief sought, here, is absolutely in the public's best interest. The public has a critical interest in preventing the further spread of the coronavirus. An outbreak at Adelanto would, further, endanger all of us — Adelanto detainees, Adelanto employees, residents of San Bernardino County, residents of the State of California, and our nation as a whole.

Bravo Castillo, 2020 WL 1502864 at *6. An outbreak at Adelanto would endanger the detainees, employees, residents of San Bernardino County and the State of California, and our nation as a whole. Fewer detainees in immigration detention will make the eventual outbreaks easier to contain. The relief sought here in fact advances the Government, and the public's, interest in maintaining a safe and healthy environment in its detention center.

V. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REQUIRE SECURITY

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) can require a security for a temporary restraining order, a district court "has discretion as to the amount of security required, if any." *Jorgensen v. Cassiday*, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). No security is appropriate where, as here, there is no quantifiable harm to the restrained party and where the order is in the public interest. *Save Our Sonoran, Inc v. Flowers*, 408 F.3d 1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005); *Johnson v. Couturier*, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009). Indeed, district courts routinely exercise their discretion to not require security in cases brought by indigent or

1	incarcerated people. Taylor-Failor v. County of Hawaii, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1095,	
2	1102–03 (D. Haw. 2015) (requiring no security because plaintiffs were "of limited	
3	financial means"); Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1165 (D.	
4	Ore. 2018) (dispensing security requirement for temporary restraining order	
5	involving immigration detainees); Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (E.D.	
6	Wash. 2017) (not requiring security for temporary restraining order seeking release	
7	from custody).	
8	Due to his prolonged detention, Mr. Garcia is indigent. He therefore	
9	respectfully requests that this Court exercise its discretion and not require him to	
10	post security.	
11	VI. CONCLUSION	
12	For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Garcia respectfully—but urgently—requests	
13	that this Court order his immediate release from punitive detention at Adelanto and	
14	any other relief this Court deems just and equitable.	
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16	Dated: 4/15/2020 IMMIGRANT DEFENDERS LAW CENTER	
17	By: <u>/s/ Hannah K. Comstock</u> Hannah K. Comstock, Esq.	
18	Munmeeth K. Soni, Esq.	
19	Counsel for Petitioner	
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